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We propose an empirical procedure, which exploits the conditional heteroscedasticity 
of fundamental disturbances, to test the targeting and orthogonality restrictions 
imposed in the recent VAR literature to identify monetary policy shocks. Based on 
U.S. monthly data for the post-1982 period, we reject the nonborrowed-reserve and 
interest-rate targeting procedures. In contrast, we present evidence supporting 
targeting procedures implying more than one policy variable. We also always reject 
the orthogonality conditions between policy shocks and macroeconomic variables. 
We show that using invalid restrictions often produces misleading policy measures 
and dynamic responses. These results have important implications for the 
measurement of policy shocks and their temporal effects as well as for the estimation 
of the monetary authority’s reaction function. 
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JEL Classification: C32, E52 1. Introduction
There has been in recent years a considerable interest in the identiﬁcation
of monetary policy shocks and measurement of their eﬀects on the economy.1 An
important strand of literature uses vector autoregressions (VAR) to generate various
data-based measures of policy shocks. These shocks are typically identiﬁed by
imposing targeting and orthogonality restrictions. The targeting restrictions deﬁne
the monetary policy indicator, while the orthogonality conditions imply that the
policy shocks have no current eﬀects on macroeconomic variables such as output and
price indices. Unfortunately, it is impossible to formally verify the validity of these
identifying restrictions by performing joint statistical tests. Rather, the selection of
the restrictions relies on prior beliefs about the Federal Reserve operating procedures
and about the signs, shapes, and persistence of certain dynamic responses to policy
shocks. Thus, this approach entails a certain amount of subjectivity.
This paper proposes a procedure which permits for the ﬁrst time formal
testing of the identifying conditions assumed in the VAR-based literature. For this
purpose, we use a ﬂexible structural VAR (SVAR) that displays three important
features. First, unlike previous studies, it relaxes the assumption that the fun-
damental disturbances are conditionally homoscedastic. Importantly, accounting
for time-varying conditional volatilities leads to the overidentiﬁcation of the SVAR
(e.g. Sentana, 1992; King, Sentana and Wadhwani, 1994; Sentana and Fiorentini,
2001; Normandin, 1999). Hence, the restrictions typically imposed in earlier work
to identify monetary policy shocks become individually and jointly testable.
1 See Pagan and Robertson (1995), Bernanke and Mihov (1998), Christiano, Eichenbaum,
and Evans (1999) and the references therein.
1Second, our SVAR incorporates a standard model of the market for bank
reserves (e.g. Brunner, 1994; Gordon and Leeper, 1994; Bernanke and Mihov, 1998).
This model nests the most popular monetary policy indicators. This allows us to test
the indicators related to interest-rate targeting (e.g. Bernanke and Blinder, 1992;
Sims, 1992), nonborrowed-reserve targeting (e.g. Eichenbaum, 1992; Christiano
and Eichenbaum, 1992), borrowed-reserve targeting (e.g. Cosimano and Sheehan,
1994), adjusted nonborrowed-reserve targeting (e.g. Strongin, 1995), and mixed
interest-rate and reserve targeting (e.g. Bernanke and Mihov, 1998).
Third, our SVAR admits current interactions between the monetary policy
variables and macroeconomic aggregates such as output and prices. This allows
us to test the orthogonality conditions. To do so, we verify whether the policy
variables directly aﬀect current output and prices. Moreover, we check whether the
policy variables indirectly aﬀect contemporaneous output and prices through their
current impacts on other non-policy variables.
We estimate our SVAR using U.S. monthly data for the post-1982 period.
The estimates reveal that all, but one, structural innovations display time-varying
conditional variances. In particular, the policy shocks exhibit pronounced volatil-
ities for the 1984:05-1985:02 and 1988:04-1991:03 periods. Interestingly, the ﬁrst
episode coincides almost exactly with the Continental Illinois incident, where the
Fed has sterilized the eﬀects of its extensive lending to this commercial bank. The
second episode is consistent with the 1988 contractionary monetary policy reported
by Romer and Romer (1994), and accords with common observations about changes
in monetary policy through the 1990-1991 recession (e.g. Strongin, 1995). These
major volatility shifts allow the identiﬁcation of the policy shocks, without having
to resort to the traditional restrictions.
2We test the identifying restrictions behind the various targeting procedures.
The restrictions associated with interest-rate or nonborrowed-reserve targeting are
strongly rejected, whereas those implying the other targeting procedures are not.
These results sharply discriminate between interest-rate and borrowed-reserve tar-
getings, which many observers believe to be very close in practice and empirically
hard to distinguish. Our ﬁndings also help to isolate the causes for rejecting some
policy indicators. For example, interest-rate targeting is rejected because the as-
sumption that the Fed fully oﬀsets shocks to the borrowing demand is inconsistent
with evidence, while nonborrowed-reserve targeting is refuted since the requirement
that the Fed does not respond to shocks to total reserves is not supported by the
data.
We also ﬁnd that the orthogonality conditions are strongly rejected. Specif-
ically, the direct eﬀects of policy shocks are signiﬁcant for interest-rate and mixed
interest-rate and reserve targetings, where for both procedures the interest rate
represents a policy variable. The indirect eﬀects are statistically important for the
other procedures, where the interest rate is a non-policy variable. Consequently, our
results suggest that the policy shocks have most of their current eﬀects on output
and prices through the adjustment of interest rates.
Next, we document the implications of these test results for policy. To do
this, we ﬁrst compare key policy measures obtained from various sets of restrictions
with the valid counterparts derived from our ﬂexible SVAR. The measures decom-
pose the monetary authority’s reaction function into policy shocks and feedback
eﬀects, and distinguish between the Fed’s exogenous changes in policy and system-
atic responses to ﬂuctuations in output and prices. Interestingly, the true targeting
restrictions produce policy shocks and feedback eﬀects that track remarkably well
3the valid policy measures. In contrast, the false interest-rate targeting restrictions
yield policy shocks and feedback eﬀects that often display the wrong signs, while the
invalid nonborrowed-reserve targeting restrictions lead to reasonable policy shocks
but misleading feedback eﬀects. In addition, the false orthogonality conditions al-
ways distort the measures of policy shocks and feedback eﬀects. Overall, these
ﬁndings reveal that the speciﬁcation of the Fed’s reaction function must involve
valid policy indicators. These indicators are combinations of the diﬀerent reserve
variables, rather than a single variable such as the interest rate or nonborrowed
reserves. Also, the estimation of the Fed’s feedback rule must rely on methods that
relax the orthogonality conditions. Such methods include the instrumental-variable
approach, but not the ordinary-least-square technique.
We complete the analysis of the implications for policy by confronting the
temporal eﬀects of policy shocks derived from diﬀerent sets of restrictions with the
valid dynamic responses computed from our ﬂexible SVAR. The true targeting re-
strictions produce dynamic responses that are very close to their valid counterparts.
However, the invalid restrictions associated with the interest-rate indicator substan-
tially overpredict the response of output, underpredict the response of prices, and
overestimate the liquidity eﬀect. The invalid restrictions behind the nonborrowed-
reserve targeting greatly underestimate the response of output and overstate the
response of prices. Finally, the false orthogonality restrictions always overstate the
magnitude and persistence of the responses of output.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents our ﬂexible SVAR spec-
iﬁcation. Section 3 discusses identiﬁcation issues. Section 4 reports the estimates
of the SVAR parameters. Section 5 tests the standard targeting and orthogonal-
ity restrictions. Sections 6 and 7 analyze the consequences of the various sets of
4restrictions for policy measures and there dynamic eﬀects, respectively. Section 8
concludes.
2. Speciﬁcation
We identify monetary policy shocks and estimate their eﬀects on macroeco-
nomic variables using the following SVAR system, which expresses the contempo-
raneous interactions between the variables in innovation form:
Aνt = ￿t. (1)
νt is a vector of statistical innovations extracted from the observed macroeconomic
variables and ￿t is a vector of unobserved fundamental innovations which are nor-
malized (without loss of generality) by ﬁxing their unconditional variances to unity.
The matrix A measures the interactions between current statistical innovations and
B = A−1 measures the impact responses of the variables to the fundamental dis-
turbances. The dynamic responses of the variables are obtained by substituting the
impact responses into the VAR.
Throughout our analysis, we establish a distinction between variables which
are outside the market for bank reserves or non-reserve variables, and variables
that belong to the market for bank reserves or reserve variables. The non-reserve
variables are total output, yt, the price level, pt, and the commodity price, cpt,
while the reserve variables are the nonborrowed reserves, nbrt, the total reserves,
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where the aij’s are unconstrained parameters. This system allows for interactions
between the terms within and across the blocks of reserve and non-reserve variables.
Thus, all variables may contemporaneously be aﬀected by the structural shocks.
We further develop the reserve block in (2) by incorporating a model of the
market for bank reserves:
νnbr,t = φdσd￿d,t − φbσb￿b,t + σs￿s,t, (3.1)
νtr,t = −ανff,t+ σd￿d,t, (3.2)
(νtr,t − νnbr,t)=βνff,t− σb￿b,t. (3.3)
The term ￿s,t is a shock representing an exogenous policy action taken by the Fed
or monetary policy shock, while ￿d,t and ￿b,t denote respectively the fundamental
disturbances of the demand for total reserves and borrowed reserves by commercial
banks. The parameters σs, σd, and σb are the standard deviations scaling the
structural innovations of interest, while φd and φb are unrestricted parameters, and
α and β are positive parameters. Equation (3.1) describes the procedures which
may be used by the Fed to select its monetary policy instruments. Equation (3.2)
represents the banks’ demand for total reserves in innovation form. Equation (3.3) is
the banks’ demand for borrowed reserves in innovation form, under the assumption
6of a zero discount-rate innovation. Inserting the equilibrium solution of the reserve-
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Our analysis relies on both systems (2) and (4). The conditional scedastic
structure of the systems is:
AΣtA0 =Γ t, (5)
where A is speciﬁed as in (2) or (4), while Σt = Et−1 =( νtν0
t) measures the condi-
tional nondiagonal covariance matrix of the nonorthogonal statistical innovations.
The conditional diagonal covariance matrix of the orthogonal structural innovations
is given by Γt = Et−1(￿t￿0
t), while I = E =( ￿t￿0
t) normalizes the unconditional vari-
ances of the fundamental disturbances. Conventional VAR-based studies uniformly
impose conditional homoscedasticity or Γt = I and Σt = BB0, implying that the
conditional second moments of the statistical innovations are time-invariant. In
contrast, our procedure allows the conditional second moments of the statistical
disturbances to vary over time. Speciﬁcally, in (5), Σt 6= BB0 if the conditional
variances of the fundamental shocks are time-varying, that is if Γt 6= I.
Finally, the dynamics of the conditional variances of the structural innova-
tions is speciﬁed as:
7Γt =( I − ∆1 − ∆2)+∆ 1 • (￿t−1￿0
t−1)+∆ 2 • Γt−1. (6)
The operator • denotes the element-by-element matrix multiplication, while ∆1 and
∆2 are diagonal matrices of parameters. Equation (6) involves intercepts that are
consistent with the normalisation I = E(￿t￿0
t). Also, (6) implies that all funda-
mental disturbances are conditionally homoscedastic if ∆1 and ∆2 are null. On
the other hand, some structural shocks display time-varying conditional variances
characterized by univariate generalized autoregressive conditional heteroscedastic
[GARCH(1,1)] processes if ∆1 and ∆2 — which contain the ARCH and GARCH
coeﬃcients, respectively — are positive semi-deﬁnite and (I − ∆1 − ∆2) is positive
deﬁnite. Furthermore, all the conditional variances follow GARCH(1,1) processes
if ∆1,∆ 2, and (I − ∆1 − ∆2) are positive deﬁnite. The evidence presented in En-
gle (1982), Bollerslev, Chou, and Kroner (1992), and Pagan and Robertson (1995),
among others, suggests that these processes provide a good description of the al-
ternating periods of volatility and smoothness which characterize the movements of
several macroeconomic time-series.2
3. Identiﬁcation
3.1 Identiﬁcation under the Conventional VAR-Based Approach
The conventional VAR-based approach imposes that all fundamental distur-
bances are conditionally homoscedastic (i.e. ∆1 and ∆2 are zero matrices, so Γt = I
is time-invariant). Hence, system (1) is not econometrically identiﬁed. To better
2 These processes also have the advantage that they are more parsimonious than alternative
large-scale multivariate speciﬁcations.
8understand this point, let us consider the alternative speciﬁcation:
A∗νt = ￿∗
t, (7)
where A∗ = QA, ￿∗
t = Q￿t, and Q is an orthogonal transformation matrix (i.e.
QQ0 = Q0Q = I). Equation (7) is observationally equivalent (up to second mo-
ments) to (1) (i.e. Σ∗
t =Σ t = BB0) with orthogonally rotated fundamental dis-
turbances (i.e. Γ∗
t = QΓtQ0 = I is diagonal) for any admissible transformation
matrices. It follows that A is not unique under orthogonal transformations, so
monetary policy shocks (or any other fundamental disturbances) are not identiﬁed.
Accordingly, B is not uniquely deﬁned and the dynamic responses of variables to
policy shocks also are unidentiﬁed.
A common strategy to identify monetary policy shocks without having to
identify the entire system is to impose restrictions on (1). For example, it is suﬃcient
to assume that the non-reserve variables are not contemporaneously aﬀected by
the reserve variables (Anr =[ aij] = 0 where i =1 ,2,3 and j =4 ,5,6), and
that the reserve block (Arr =[ aij] where i =4 ,5,6 and j =4 ,5,6) is identiﬁed.
These conditions ensure that Ar =( A0
nr|A0
rr)0 =( 0 0|A0
rr)0 is uniquely determined
(up to column sign changes), so Qnr = 0, and Qrr = I or Qrr = I1/2 are the
only admissible submatrices. Moreover, ﬁxing the sign of the diagonal elements
of Arr guarantees that the policy shocks are globally identiﬁed. In this context,
Br =( B0
nr|B0
rr)0 =( 0 0|A−1
rr
0)0 is also unique, and thus the responses of non-reserve
and reserve variables to policy shocks are identiﬁed.
The above restrictions can be interpreted economically. For instance, the
fourth equation in (4), representing the monetary authority’s feedback rule, can be
9rewritten as:
νs,t = ρ41νy,t + ρ42νp,t + ρ43νcp,t + σs￿s,t, (8)





measures the statistical innovation of the monetary policy indicator.
This indicator therefore includes some or all of the reserve variables since they
convey information about the stance of monetary policy, but none of the non-reserve
variables. Moreover, in making its policy the Fed possibly knows current values of
output, the price level and commodity prices.
The rule (8) nests several VAR-based policy indicators found in the literature.
Each indicator is obtained by imposing restrictions on parameter values of the model
of the market for bank reserves, so Arr is identiﬁed. These restrictions are the
following.
MIX indicator: α = 0. Accordingly, the demand for total reserves is inelastic in the
short run and νs,t =
￿
(1+φb)νnbr,t −(φd +φb)νtr,t +(βφb)νff,t
￿
.3 Thus, the policy
indicator includes the three reserve variables since the Fed adopts a mixed procedure
where it neither pursues pure interest-rate targeting nor strict reserve targeting. The
Fed therefore observes and responds to shocks to both total reserves and borrowed
reserves within the period. This procedure mainly reﬂects the Fed’s practice of
continuously monitoring total reserves (except vault cash) and borrowings.
Adjusted nonborrowed reserve (ANBR) indicator: α = φb = 0. Here, shocks to
3 This corresponds to the just identiﬁed indicator proposed by Bernanke and Mihov (1998).
The reserve block then involves six unknown parameters which are estimated from six
distinct time-invariant covariances.
10total reserves are purely demand shocks which are fully accomodated by the Fed
in the short run. The policy indicator is the adjusted nonborrowed reserves or





Borrowed reserve (BR) indicator: φd =1a n dφb = α/β. The Fed targets borrowed
reserves. As for the ANBR indicator, the policy variables are the nonborrowed
reserves and total reserves. But, the policy indicator now reduces to νs,t = −(1 +
α/β)(νtr,t − νnbr,t).
Federal funds rate (FFR) indicator: φd = 1 and φb = −1. The Fed targets the
federal funds rate and decides to fully oﬀset shocks to total reserves and borrowing
demand. The federal funds rate is the single policy variable and νs,t = −(β+α)νff,t.
Nonborrowed reserve (NBR) indicator: φd = φb = 0. The Fed targets the nonbor-
rowed reserves. Thus, the nonborrowed reserves are the single policy variable and
νs,t = νnbr,t.
Each of these sets of restrictions is combined with the additional identifying
condition that the non-reserve variables in (8) are orthogonal to current monetary
policy shocks, i.e. Anr is null. These orthogonality conditions reﬂect the assumption
that policy shocks do not impact contemporaneously on non-reserve variables.
By relaxing the orthogonality conditions, we are able to recover direct and
indirect eﬀects, which are deﬁned as follows.
Direct eﬀects. These are the contemporaneous responses of output, the price level,
and commodity prices to policy variables. For example, if the Fed targets a mix
of interest rate and reserves, the direct eﬀects are measured by aij (i =1 ,2,3 and
11j =4 ,5,6) in systems (2) and (4). Verifying zero-restrictions on these coeﬃcients
would imply that there are no direct eﬀects, in accordance with the orthogonality
conditions. On the other hand, if the Fed targets only nonborrowed reserves, the
direct eﬀects are measured by the elements ai4 (i =1 ,2,3). Again, verifying zero-
restrictions on these coeﬃcients would reveal the absence of any direct eﬀects. The
direct eﬀects for the other targeting procedures are obtained similarly.
Indirect eﬀects. These are the contemporaneous eﬀects of policy variables on output,
the price level, and commodity prices through their current impacts on the non-
policy reserve variables. For example, for the MIX indicator, there are no indirect
eﬀects because all three reserve variables are policy variables. Instead, for the NBR
indicator, the indirect eﬀects are measured by aij (i =1 ,2,3 and j =5 ,6) since
the nonborrowed reserves correspond to the policy variable, while the total reserves
and federal funds rate are the non-policy reserve variables.
In sum, to generate monetary policy shocks the standard VAR-based proce-
dure imposes the conditional homoscedasticity of SVAR residuals as well as untest-
able identifying restrictions. Speciﬁcally, with single policy variables, the policy
shocks are computed from Choleski decompositions of the VAR-residual covariance
matrix, which imply that A is lower triangular with positive elements on the diago-
nal. These decompositions are obtained by ordering the non-reserve variables ﬁrst,
followed by the policy variable, and by the other reserve variables. Since the sys-
tem is not entirely identiﬁed, the particular ordering within the block of non-reserve
variables does not aﬀect the measurement of policy shocks.
123.2 Identiﬁcation under Time-Varying Conditional Volatility
The alternative identiﬁcation strategy exploits the conditional heteroscedas-
ticity of the fundamental disturbances (i.e. ∆1 and ∆2 are positive semi-deﬁnite or
deﬁnite matrices, so Γt 6= I is time-varying). With linearly independent conditional
variances of the fundamental disturbances, system (1) is statistically identiﬁed. In
practice, this condition is satisﬁed if the conditional variances of at least all, but
one, structural shocks are time-varying — given that these variances are empirically
parametrized by the GARCH(1,1) processes (6) (e.g. Sentana, 1992; King, Sentana,
and Wadhwani, 1994; Sentana and Fiorentini, 2001; Normandin, 1999). Thus, A
is unique (up to column sign changes) under orthogonal transformations, so Q = I
and Q = I1/2 are the only admissible transformations preserving the orthogonality
of the rotated structural innovations in (7) (i.e. Γ∗
t = QΓtQ0 is diagonal). Fixing
the sign of the diagonal elements of A ensures global identiﬁcation. As a result, B
is also uniquely deﬁned.
The exactly identiﬁed elements in (2) uniquely determine some of the reserve-




In turn, these elements imply two distinct values for each of the other key parame-
ters:
13σb =1 /a64,
σs =( a66/a64 + a56/a55)/d1,
β = a66/a64,
φd = −(a66a45/a64 + a46)/d1,




σs =( −a66/a65 + a56/a55)/d2,
β = −a66/a65,
φd =( a66a45/a65 − a46)/d2,
φb =( a46 − a56a45/a55)/d2,
(11)
where d1 =( a66a44/a64 + a56a44/a55 + a45a56/a55 − a46) and d2 =( a56a44/a55 −
a66a44/a65 + a45a56/a55 − a46).
With the overidentiﬁcation of system (4), the restrictions imposed in previous
VAR-based studies can be tested econometrically. For instance, the reserve-market
speciﬁcation (3) can be tested through the joint restrictions a54 = 0 and a64 = −a65.
Under these restrictions, systems (2) and (4) coincide. Hence, policy shocks and
their eﬀects on macroeconomic variables are correctly identiﬁed and measured from
system (4). Testing speciﬁc parameters of the market for bank reserves can also
provide useful information about the policy variables which compose the monetary
instrument targeted by the Fed. Moreover, it is possible to test whether monetary
policy shocks contemporaneously aﬀect non-reserve variables, and if so, via which
14channels. Finally, the measures and eﬀects of valid policy shocks can be compared
to those of invalid ones.
4. Estimation
To implement the identiﬁcation strategy based on conditional heteroscedas-
ticity, we adopt a two-step estimation procedure. The ﬁrst step consists in an
equation-by-equation ordinary least squares (OLS) estimation of the coeﬃcients of
a standard τ-order VAR process, from which the estimates of the statistical innova-
tions νt and of their conditional covariances Σt for t =( τ +1),...,T are recovered.
More precisely, the estimate for Σt is computed by using equations (5) and (6)
evaluated for systems (2) and (4), by initializing Γτ =( ￿τ￿0
τ)=I from the uncondi-
tional moments, and by giving values to the parameters Θ — where Θ is the vector
composed of all the unconstrained elements of A,∆ 1, and ∆2.
The second step is a maximum likelihood (ML) estimation of the parameters
included in Θ. To construct the log-likelihood of the sample (ignoring the constant















where νt and Σt are evaluated at their estimates. The log-likelihood (12) is then
maximized over the parameters Θ using the BHHH algorithm.
We use U.S. monthly data for the period 1982:11-1998:12. According to many
observers, this period has been characterized by a stable policy environment. The
six variables included in the VAR are the industrial production index, yt, the all-
15item, all-urban-consumer, price index, pt, the world export commodity price index,
cpt, the nonborrowed reserves, nbrt, the total reserves adjusted for changes in reserve
requirements, trt, and the average of the daily federal funds rate, fft. The series
yt, nbrt, trt, and fft are released by the Federal Reserve Board of Governors, while
pt and cpt are taken from the U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics and the International
Financial Statistics. All data are seasonally adjusted and expressed in logs, except
for the federal funds rate which is seasonally unadjusted and in percentage.
We set the number of lags in the VAR process to six (τ= 6).4 We ﬁnd that,
for this lag structure, none of the ﬁrst 18 autocorrelations for all statistical residu-
als exceed two asymptotic standard errors. Also, using a heteroscedasticity-robust
gauss newton regression (HRGNR) procedure allowing for conditional heteroscedas-
ticity of unknown form (Davidson and Mackinnon 1993), we are unable to detect
ﬁrst-, third-, sixth-, and 12th-order serial correlation for the VAR residuals at the
5% level. Interestingly, some of the ﬁrst 18 autocorrelations are signiﬁcant at the 5%
level for all squared statistical innovations, except for industrial production. Similar
results are obtained by applying the Lagrange multiplier (LM) test for ﬁrst-, third-,
and sixth-order ARCH eﬀects. These ﬁndings conﬁrm the presence of conditional
heteroscedasticity in all, but one, statistical innovations, which is likely to trans-
late into time-varying conditional variances of some, and perhaps, all fundamental
shocks — given that Σt 6= BB0 if Γt 6= I.
For the sake of brevity, we present only the ML estimates of the GARCH(1,1)
parameters (in this section) and the reserve-market parameters (in the next section).
Table 1 shows that the ARCH and GARCH coeﬃcients are almost identical whether
4 This lag structure is also used by Gordon and Leeper (1994), Pagan and Robertson (1995),
and Strongin (1995) for a similar data sample.
16they are based on system (2) or (4). Moreover, they systematically imply that
(I − ∆1 − ∆2) is positive deﬁnite, and that ∆1 and ∆2 are positive semi-deﬁnite.
This follows from our ﬁnding that one structural innovation, ￿1t, exhibits a time-
invariant conditional variance. In contrast, the fundamental disturbances ￿3t and
￿5t/￿dt display time-varying conditional volatilities that are moderately persistent
as measured by the sum of the ARCH and GARCH coeﬃcients, while ￿2t, ￿4t/￿st
and ￿6t/￿bt have highly persistent time-varying conditional variances.
The estimated conditional volatilities also provide an adequate description
of the conditional heteroscedasticity of the fundamental innovations. Speciﬁcally,
none of the ﬁrst 18 autocorrelations for each squared fundamental shock relative to
its conditional variance exceed two asymptotic standard errors. Furthermore, the
LM test statistics for GARCH(p,q) are never signiﬁcant at the 5% level — where
p = 0 for ￿1t and p = 1 otherwise, while q =3 ,6,12. Again, these ﬁndings hold
whether the structural disturbances are estimated from system (2) or (4).
Moreover, the order condition for the identiﬁcation of systems (2) and (4)
is satisﬁed given that, for each system, ﬁve of the six structural innovations dis-
play conditional heteroscedasticity. As expected, the rank condition is also veriﬁed
for both systems, that is, the conditional variances of the fundamental shocks are
linearly independent. Speciﬁcally, λ = 0 is the only solution to the system of
homogeneous linear equations Γλ = 0, since empirically (Γ0Γ) has a large posi-
tive determinant and is invertible — where Γ stacks by column the estimates (for
t =( τ +1 ) ,...,T) of the conditional volatility for each of the six structural shocks
extracted from system (2) or (4). This translates into log-likelihood functions that
are not ﬂat. In other words, system (2) or (4) yields similar estimates of the pa-
rameters under alternative starting values for Θ. These ﬁndings are crucial since
17they conﬁrm that monetary policy shocks and their eﬀects can be identiﬁed without
having to resort to restrictions as in previous conditional-homoscedastic VAR-based
studies.
5. Test Results
Using the ML estimates of systems (2) and (4), we assess the empirical
validity of several identifying assumptions typically imposed in the literature. We
ﬁrst focus on the restrictions related to monetary policy indicators. For this purpose,
Table 2 presents the estimates of the reserve-market parameters. Our estimates of
φd are close to 0.8 and are always statistically signiﬁcant. These estimates imply
that the Fed has almost fully accommodated shocks to total reserves during the
period under study. These ﬁndings are consistent with the FFR and BR indicators
since both require φd = 1, but contradict the NBR indicator which imposes φd =0 .
The estimated values of φb are systematically low — between 0.017 and 0.130 —
and statistically insigniﬁcant, and are thus consistent with the restriction φb =0o f
the ANBR and NBR indicators but not with φb = −1 of the FFR indicator. Our
estimates of α are close to zero, while those of β lie between 0.075 and 0.307 and
are often statistically insigniﬁcant. These estimated values of α are consistent with
the MIX and ANBR indicators which both set α = 0. Finally, our estimated values
of φb, α and β are consistent with the BR indicator, where φb = α/β.
Table 3 reports the p-values of the χ2 joint test statistics associated with the
various targeting procedures. These tests cannot reject the identifying assumptions
behind the MIX, ANBR, and BR indicators. In contrast, the restrictions resulting
in the FFR and NBR indicators are strongly rejected by the data. These ﬁndings
are robust whether they are obtained from system (2) or (4).
18The test results indicate that only the policy indicators which are constructed
from more than one reserve variable receive empirical support. Speciﬁcally, the
evidence in favour of the MIX indicator suggests that the policy variables correspond
to the three reserve variables, while the empirical support for the ANBR and BR
indicators reveals that the policy variables are the nonborrowed reserves and total
reserves. Hence, no single variable such as the federal funds rate or the nonborrowed
reserves represent by itself the policy variable.
Moreover, the rejection of the NBR indicator appears consistent with the
view held by some observers that the Fed has implemented a nonborrowed-reserve
targeting procedure only during the brief period from 1979:10 to 1982:09. There is
more uncertainty, however, surrounding the procedure used by the Fed after 1982.
For instance, some observers believe that the Fed has adopted a federal-funds-rate
targeting procedure over that period. However, both the interest-rate and the
borrowed-reserve targeting procedures are known to be quite similar in practice
(e.g. Strongin, 1995; Bernanke and Mihov, 1998). Our tests clearly reject the
FFR indicator in favour of the BR indicator. This can be explained by considering
that the diﬀerence between the two procedures becomes evident only when there
is a shift in the borrowing function. Under the borrowed-reserve targeting, a shift
in the borrowing function causes the interest rates to change (i.e. φb = α/β).
Under the federal-funds-rate targeting, the reserve mix is adjusted to exactly oﬀset
the shift in the borrowing function and to keep the federal funds rate steady (i.e.
φb = −1). Our estimates of φb are low and statistically insigniﬁcant, which explains
why the joint restrictions φd = 1 and φb = −1 implied by the FFR indicator are
strongly rejected. On the other hand, our estimates are not inconsistent with the
joint restrictions φd = 1 and φb = α/β of the BR indicator.
19Another important test veriﬁes the validity of the orthogonality conditions.
To this end, Table 4 presents the p-values of the χ2 joint test statistics of the
restrictions related to the direct and indirect eﬀects of policy shocks. These tests
strongly reject the orthogonality conditions according to which policy shocks do not
have a contemporaneous impact on non-reserve variables. Speciﬁcally, the direct
eﬀects of policy shocks are statistically signiﬁcant when the Fed targets a mix of
interest rate and reserves or the federal funds rate exclusively, while indirect eﬀects
are statistically signiﬁcant under the ANBR, BR, or NBR indicators. Considering
the deﬁnitions of policy variables under the alternative targeting procedures, these
results imply that the impact of policy shocks on non-reserve variables is felt mostly
through the federal funds rate (i.e. ai6 6= 0 where i =1 ,2,3). Again, these ﬁndings
do not depend on the particular system used.
Finally, the p-values of the χ2 joint test statistics of both the restrictions
related to each targeting procedures and the orthogonality conditions are always
equal to zero under systems (2) and (4). These test results thus conﬁrm that
the various policy measures proposed in the VAR-based literature rely on invalid
identifying assumptions.
6. Monetary Policy Measures
We document the implications of imposing the sets of identifying restric-
tions tested above on diﬀerent monetary policy measures. The ﬁrst measure corre-
sponds to the conditional variance of policy shocks (￿s,t). It provides information
about the main volatility shifts which allow for the identiﬁcaton of policy shocks.
Furthermore, we can have some idea about the sources of these shifts by relating
the conditional-variance series to economic and ﬁnancial events. The second mea-
20sure extracts the scaled policy shocks (σs￿s,t) from the Fed’s reaction function (8).
For ease of interpretation, this noisy (serially uncorrelated) measure is smoothed
from a ﬁve-month centered, equal-weighted moving average. The smoothed policy
shocks capture the Fed’s exogenous changes in monetary policy. Negative (posi-
tive) values of the smoothed shocks represent contractionary (expansionary) unan-
ticipated monetary policies. The third measure corresponds to the feedback eﬀets
(ρ41νy,t + ρ42νp,t + ρ43νcp,t) in (8). This component is also smoothed from a ﬁve-
month centered, equal-weighted moving average. The smoothed feedback eﬀects
capture the Fed’s systematic responses to changes in non-reserve variables.
We confront diﬀerent sets of monetary policy measures. One set, which we
refer to as the valid measures, is computed from the ML estimates of the parameters
of system (4) and of the GARCH(1,1) processes (6). We rely on system (4) as
it provides an adequate representation of the reserve market. In particular, as
shown previously, system (4) generates estimates of the reserve-market parameters
which are similar to those obtained from the unrestricted system (2). Also, the
joint restrictions a54 = 0 and a64 = −a65 involved in (4) are not rejected, with
a p-value of the underlying χ2 statistic equal to 0.186. The alternative sets of
measures are calculated from the ML estimates of restricted systems’ parameters
and the GARCH(1,1) coeﬃcients. These systems impose various sets of identifying
restrictions on targeting procedures, but relax the orthogonality conditions.
Figure 1 compares the valid measures with those obtained under the BR
indicator (ﬁrst column), the FFR indicator (second column), and the NBR indicator
(third column). To facilitate comparisons, the valid and alternative measures are
normalized to have the same mean (for the conditional volatilities) and identical
variances (for smoothed policy shocks and feedback eﬀects). We do not report the
21measures related to the MIX and ANBR indicators since they are almost identical
to those of the BR indicator.
First, we describe our valid measures. The valid smoothed policy shocks
exhibit a very large volatility between 1984:05 and 1985:02 reﬂecting several ma-
jor downward surges. Interestingly, this period coincides almost exactly with the
episode during which the Fed has sterilized the eﬀects of its extensive lending to
the Continental Illinois Bank, via the selling of treasury securities (e.g. Benston,
Eisenbeis, Horvitz, and Kaufman, 1986). As a result, the total reserves stayed at
about the same level, but their composition changed following the increase in bor-
rowed reserves and the decrease in nonborrowed reserves. In terms of innovations,
the decrease in nonborrowed reserves during this period constitutes by far the most
important variation of all those computed for reserve and non-reserve variables of
system (4). Given the feedback rule (8), this implies substantial declines in the pol-
icy indicator (i.e. a combination of the innovations of the three reserve variables)
and negative values for policy shocks.
In addition, our valid smoothed policy shocks display a high volatility for
the period 1988:04-1991:03 which seems to result from a pronounced unanticipated
contractionary policy from 1988:01 to 1988:05, an expansionary policy between
1988:06 and 1989:11, a severe monetary tightening from 1989:12 to 1990:04, and
an easier policy from 1990:05 to 1991:03. Interestingly, the dating of the restrictive
policy recorded in 1988 from our measure is quite close to the tight policy action
in 1988:12 reported by Romer and Romer (1994), based on their reading of the
minutes of the Federal Open Market Committee. Moreover, the post-1988 pattern
is consistent with some common observations about changes in monetary policy
that occured through the business cycle phases (e.g. Strongin, 1995). In particular,
22there was a severe monetary contraction before the business cycle peak recorded
in 1990:07, followed by easing policy actions until the trough in 1991:03, and by a
somewhat tighter policy in the months that followed.
According to our valid measure of the smoothed feedback eﬀects, the Fed
has often responded to ﬂuctuations in non-reserve variables. The most important
downward movements are recorded in 1988:05 and 1990:08, while pronounced up-
ward spikes are observed in 1986:02, 1987:12, 1995:07, and 1996:06. Also, the
feedback component was positive during the Continental Illinois episode, negative
during the 1988 unanticipated contractionary policy, and negative during the 1990-
1991 recession. Moreover, it was progressively smaller (in absolute values) from
peak to trough.
Comparing the valid measures reported above with alternative ones, we ﬁnd
that the measures derived from the restrictions identifying the borrowed-reserve
targeting procedure coincide almost perfectly with their valid counterparts. For
instance, the correlations between the BR-induced and valid measures are 0.987
for the conditional volatilities, 0.995 for the smoothed policy shocks, and 0.781 for
the smoothed feedback eﬀects. These high correlations strongly suggest that the
valid restrictions associated with the borrowed-reserve targeting procedure allow
an adequate disentanglement of the monetary authority’s reaction function (8) in
terms of policy shock and feedback eﬀects.
In contrast, the measures corresponding to the interest-rate targeting pro-
cedure always diﬀer sharply from their valid counterparts. For example, the FFR
indicator produces a ﬂatter conditional volatility that substantially understates the
pronounced ﬂuctuations recorded in 1984. Also, this indicator yields measures of
23policy shocks and feedback eﬀects that often display the wrong signs. This trans-
lates into weak correlations between the FFR-based and valid measures of 0.306 for
the conditional volatilities, 0.162 for the smoothed policy shocks, and −0.251 for the
smoothed feedback eﬀects. Hence, the invalid restrictions behind the interest-rate
targeting procedure produce highly misleading results regarding policy shocks and
feedback eﬀects associated with the monetary policy.
The measures derived from the nonborrowed-reserve targeting track some of
the valid measures quite well. For instance, the correlations between the NBR-policy
and valid measures are respectively 0.893 and 0.923 for the conditional volatilities
and the smoothed policy shocks. However, it is only 0.323 for the smoothed feed-
back eﬀects. Hence, the invalid restrictions identifying the NBR indicator yield a
reasonable measure of policy shocks, but a misleading measure of feedback eﬀects.
Finally, the measures obtained by adding the orthogonality conditions to
the sets of targeting restrictions diﬀer more sharply from the valid measures. This
is because these conditions constrain the current non-reserve variables and policy
shocks to be orthogonal. Consequently, the correlation between feedback eﬀects
and policy shocks in (8) is ﬁxed to zero. In contrast, the correlations between these
components are -0.125 and -0.106 for the smoothed and unsmoothed valid measures.
Thus, imposing the false orthogonality restrictions distorts the decomposition of the
monetary authority’s reaction function into policy shocks and feedback eﬀets.
Taken together, these ﬁndings have important implications for the speciﬁca-
tion and estimation of the Fed’s reaction function. First, the econometric speciﬁ-
cation must be consistent with the valid restrictions leading to the MIX, ANBR,
or BR indicator. This means that valid policy indicators need to combine either
24the three reserve variables, or a mix of the nonborrowed reserves and total re-
serves. This diﬀers sharply with the practice of approximating the policy indicator
by a single variable such as the federal funds rate or the nonborrowed reserves.
Second, the estimation method must relax the orthogonality conditions. In this
sense, an instrumental-variable approach is appropriate to estimate the coeﬃcients
of the monetary authority’s reaction function. In contrast, the common practice
of applying the OLS technique is inadequate, given that it assumes the orthogo-
nality between the non-reserve variables and policy shocks. In sum, it is only by
meeting these econometric requirements that it is possible to adequately decompose
the monetary authority’s reaction function into policy shocks and feedback eﬀects,
and to distinguish between the Fed’s exogenous changes in policy and systematic
responses to ﬂuctuations in non-reserve variables.
7. Dynamic Responses
To analyze the temporal eﬀects of the identiﬁed fundamental disturbances,
we report the dynamic responses of the variables to monetary policy shocks, as well
as to shocks to the demand for total reserves and borrowed reserves. For reasons
explained above, we refer to the responses computed from the ML estimates of
the parameters of system (4) and of the GARCH(1,1) processes (6) as the valid
responses.
Figure 2 displays the valid responses with their (possibly asymmetric) 68%
probability intervals.5 First we examine the response of the non-reserve and reserve
variables to a positive, one unconditional standard-deviation policy shock. These
5 The intervals are computed using Sims and Zha’s (1999) bayesian procedure based on
unconditional moments.
25are presented in the ﬁrst two columns. An expansionary policy shock generates
a persistent, hump-shaped increase in output, with the response peaking seven
months after the shock. The price level also increases, but its response is imprecisely
estimated. The commodity prices increase sharply. There is also a signiﬁcant decline
in the federal funds rate, or liquidity eﬀect, over a period of six months after the
shock. The nonborrowed reserves increase during the ﬁrst ﬁve months and then
decline after. Finally, the total reserves increase initially and fall after.
The third column shows how the reserve variables respond to a positive, one
unconditional standard-deviation, shock to total reserves while the fourth column
displays the responses of the reserve variables to a negative, one unconditional
standard-deviation shock to borrowed reserves. A positive shock to total reserves
triggers a sharp, persistent increase both in the nonborrowed reserves and total
reserves. The federal funds rate initially rises and then falls. A negative shock to
borrowed reserves produces a large, persistent decline in the nonborrowed reserves
and total reserves, and a persistent increase in the federal funds rate. These dynamic
responses are generally consistent with the identifying assumptions associated with
the MIX, ANBR, and BR indicators. In contrast, they are inconsistent with the
FFR indicator which requires that the monetary authority smooths the federal
funds rate by increasing the nonborrowed reserves after a negative shock to borrowed
reserves, and with the NBR indicator, where the Fed does not alter the nonborrowed
reserves after a non-policy shock.
Comparing the valid responses obtained from system (4) with those esti-
mated under the various identiﬁcation conditions helps to evaluate the consequences
of imposing the invalid restrictions. For the valid MIX, BR and ANBR indicators,
we present only the ﬁndings obtained with the BR indicator since the results are
26very similar for all these indicators.
Figure 3 provides the responses corresponding to the borrowed reserve indi-
cator. We report three sets of responses: the valid responses obtained from system
(4), those obtained by imposing only the valid restrictions identifying the borrowed-
reserve targeting procedure, and the responses generated by further imposing the
false orthogonality restrictions.
The responses obtained by imposing only the valid restrictions identifying the
BR indicator are very similar to those of the valid system. In particular, the signs,
magnitudes and shapes of responses match very closely. In contrast, adding the
invalid orthogonality restrictions signiﬁcantly distorts many responses. Speciﬁcally,
these false restrictions substantially overstate the response of output to a policy
shock. Furthermore, the reserve variables respond very diﬀerently to a shock to
total reserves or to borrowed reserves. In particular, both the responses of the
nonborrowed reserves and total reserves to a shock to borrowed reserves have the
wrong sign. These ﬁndings corroborate our conclusions based on formal tests that
the restrictions associated with borrowed-reserve targeting are empirically valid,
while the orthogonality conditions are not. Also, these results show that the invalid
orthogonality restrictions tend to considerably reduce the eﬀects of the shifts in
the borrowing function. As explained previously, it becomes more diﬃcult in this
context to discriminate between the borrowed-reserve and interest-rate targeting
procedures.
Figure 4 compares the valid responses with those obtained under the interest-
rate targeting procedure, with and without the orthogonality restrictions. A striking
feature is the large diﬀerence in these responses. A notable example is the response
27of prices to a policy shock. While system (4) generates a rise in prices following an
expansionary policy shock, the invalid restrictions lead to a decline in prices. This
anomalous response of prices, often called the price puzzle, has previously been
noted in the literature (e.g. Eichenbaum, 1992; Sims, 1992; Sims and Zha, 1995;
Christiano, Eichenbaum, and Evans, 1996). Unlike the explanations that have been
oﬀered for its existence in the past literature, our ﬁndings suggest that it may be an
artifact of imposing the false identifying restrictions. Apart from the price puzzle,
the false restrictions also overstate the response of output to a policy shock by a
signiﬁcant amount. They further imply a much sharper and persistent decline in
the federal funds rate or liquidity eﬀect than with the valid system. Imposing only
the invalid restrictions identifying the FFR indicator does not signiﬁcantly alter the
responses of the reserve variables to a shock to total reserves. However, imposing
the orthogonality restrictions underpredicts these responses substantially. Finally,
the false restrictions produce highly misleading responses of the reserve variables to
a shock to borrowed reserves.
Figure 5 contrasts the responses implied by the NBR indicator with their
valid counterparts. Without the orthogonality conditions, the two output responses
match fairly well, although the invalid restrictions identifying the NBR indicator
somewhat underestimate the rise in output after the ﬁrst twelve months. Adding
the false orthogonality conditions has the opposite eﬀect: it signiﬁcantly overesti-
mates the response of output following an expansionary policy shock. Unlike the
FFR indicator, the NBR-policy shock produces a rise in nominal prices, but the
invalid restrictions identifying the NBR targeting procedure substantially overstate
the price response. The liquidity eﬀects obtained under the false restrictions and
with system (4) are very similar. Therefore, although the orthogonality conditions
28and the restrictions identifying the NBR indicator are jointly invalid, they do not
generate the price puzzle or overestimate the liquidity eﬀect. Finally, the invalid
restrictions greatly aﬀect the responses of the reserve variables to a shock to total
reserves or to borrowed reserves.
These ﬁndings have important implications for evaluating the eﬀects of mon-
etary policy. First, an accurate description of the dynamic impacts of policy shocks
requires the use of the valid restrictions identifying the MIX, ANBR, or BR tar-
geting procedure. We have shown that compared to the valid restrictions, the false
restrictions associated with the FFR indicator substantially overpredict the response
of output, underpredict the response of prices, and overestimate the liquidity eﬀect.
Also, the invalid restrictions associated with the NBR targeting procedure greatly
underestimate the increase in output and overstate the rise in prices. Second, an
analysis of the dynamic impacts of policy shocks must relax the orthogonality con-
ditions. These invalid restrictions always substantially overstate the magnitude and
persistence of the response of output.
8. Conclusion
In this paper, we proposed a procedure to test the targeting and orthogonal
restrictions traditionally imposed to identify monetary policy shocks. The novel
aspect of this approach is that it accounts for the time-varying conditional volatility
of fundamental disturbances. In this context, the SVAR becomes over-identiﬁed, so
that the restrictions can be tested individually and jointly.
Our estimates indicate that all, but one, structural innovations display time-
varying conditional variances. Interestingly, the pronounced movements in these
29variances coincide with speciﬁc events, such as the Continental Illinois incident and
the 1990-1991 recession. Also, the major volatility shifts allow the identiﬁcation of
the policy shocks.
The test results reveal that the targeting restrictions associated with the
interest-rate or nonborrowed-reserve indicator are strongly rejected, while those
behind the other policy indicators are not. Also, the orthogonality conditions are
strongly rejected, given that the policy shocks contemporanously aﬀect output and
prices mainly through current adjustments of interest rates.
These ﬁndings have important implications for policy. Speciﬁcally, the policy
shocks and their dynamic eﬀects on the economy are adequately measured from the
valid targeting restrictions. In contrast, misleading policy measures and dynamic
responses are obtained from the invalid restrictions associated with interest-rate tar-
geting, nonborrowed-reserve targeting, or orthogonality conditions. Finally, policy
indicators combining serveral reserve variables and estimation techniques relaxing
the orthogonality conditions are required to appropriately decompose the monetary
authority’s reaction function into policy shocks and feedback eﬀects, and to distin-
guish between the Fed’s exogenous changes in policy and systematic responses to
ﬂuctuations in output and prices.
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32Table 1. Estimates of the GARCH(1,1) Parameters
Shocks Parameters System (2) System(4)
￿1t ARCH — —
GARCH — —




￿3t ARCH 0.285 0.277
(0.128) (0.125)
GARCH — —




￿5t/￿dt ARCH 0.435 0.352
(0.168) (0.190)
GARCH — —




Note: Entries are the ML estimates (standard errors) of the ARCH and GARCH coeﬃcients of the
GARCH(1,1) processes (6) evaluated for systems (2) and (4). — indicates that zero-restrictions
are imposed to ensure that ∆1 and ∆2 are non-negative deﬁnite.
33Table 2. Estimates of the Reserve-Market Parameters
Parameters System (2) System (4)
























Note: Entries are the estimates (standard errors) of the structural parameters of the reserve-
market model (3). These statistics are computed from the ML estimates of systems (2) and (4).
For system (2), a unique value of the structural parameters σd and α is recovered from equations
(9), two distinct values of σs, σb, β, φd, and φb are derived from (i) equations (10) and (ii)
equations (11), and the covariance matrices of these parameters are DΨD
0 — where D are the
matrices of numerical derivatives of expressions (i) (9) and (10) and (ii) (9) and (11) with respect
to the parameters in (2), and Ψ is the covariance matrix of those parameters. For system (4), the
estimates and the covariance matrix of the reserve-market parameters are directly obtained.
34Table 3. Tests of Identiﬁcation Conditions: Monetary Policy Indicators
Monetary Policy Indicators System (2) System (4)
MIX
α = 0 0.275 0.587
ANBR
α = φb = 0 (i) 0.533 0.795
(ii) 0.546
BR
φb = α/β and φd = 1 (i) 0.234 0.185
(ii) 0.245
FFR
φb = −1 and φd = 1 (i) 0.000 0.000
(ii) 0.000
NBR
φb = φd = 0 (i) 0.000 0.000
(ii) 0.000
Note: Entries are p-values of the χ
2 test statistics for various identifying restrictions related to
the reserve variables. These statistics are computed from the ML estimates of systems (2) and
(4). For system (2), a unique value of the structural parameters σd and α is recovered from
equations (9), two distinct values of σs, σb, β, φd, and φb are derived from (i) equations (10) and
(ii) equations (11), and the covariance matrices of these parameters are DΨD
0 — where D are the
matrices of numerical derivatives of expressions (i) (9) and (10) and (ii) (9) and (11) with respect
to the parameters in (2), and Ψ is the covariance matrix of those parameters. For system (4), the
estimates and the covariance matrix of the reserve-market parameters are directly obtained.
35Table 4. Tests of Identiﬁcation Conditions: Direct and Indirect Eﬀects
Monetary Policy Indicators System (2) System (4)
MIX
Direct Eﬀects: ai4 = ai5 = ai6 = 0 0.000 0.000
ANBR
Direct Eﬀects: ai4 = ai5 = 0 0.306 0.248
Indirect Eﬀects: ai6 = 0 0.000 0.000
BR
Direct Eﬀects: ai4 = ai5 = 0 0.306 0.248
Indirect Eﬀects: ai6 = 0 0.000 0.000
FFR
Direct Eﬀects: ai6 = 0 0.000 0.000
Indirect Eﬀects: ai4 = ai5 = 0 0.306 0.248
NBR
Direct Eﬀects: ai4 = 0 0.831 0.792
Indirect Eﬀects: ai5 = ai6 = 0 0.000 0.000
Note: i=1,2,3. Entries are p-values of the χ
2 test statistics for various identifying restrictions
related to the non-reserve variables. These statistics are computed from the ML estimates of
systems (2) and (4).
36Figure 1. Monetary Policy Measures

































































































































































































































































































































Note: The solid lines correspond to the valid monetary policy measures. The dotted lines are
the monetary policy measures obtained by imposing the restrictions associated with either the
borrowed reserve indicator, the federal funds rate indicator, or the nonborrowed reserve indicator,
but without assuming the orthogonality conditions.
37Figure 2. Dynamic Responses:































































































































































































































































































































































































































Note: The solid lines correspond to the valid responses. The dotted lines represent the error bands
associated with the 68% probability intervals.
38Figure 3. Dynamic Responses:




























































































































































































































































































































































































































Note: The solid lines correspond to the valid responses. The dashed lines represent the responses
obtained by imposing only the restrictions associated with the borrowed reserve indicator. The
dotted lines are the responses obtained by further imposing the restrictions related to the orthog-
onality conditions.
39Figure 4. Dynamic Responses:




























































































































































































































































































































































































































Note: The solid lines correspond to the valid responses. The dashed lines represent the responses
obtained by imposing only the restrictions associated with the federal funds rate indicator. The
dotted lines are the responses obtained by further imposing the restrictions related to the orthog-
onality conditions.
40Figure 5. Dynamic Responses:




























































































































































































































































































































































































































Note: The solid lines correspond to the valid responses. The dashed lines represent the responses
obtained by imposing only the restrictions associated with the nonborrowed reserve indicator.
The dotted lines are the responses obtained by further imposing the restrictions related to the
orthogonality conditions.
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